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Abstract 
  By combining the post of the High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy with that of the External Relations Commissioner, the Treaty of Lisbon 
created the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy  and Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), who is additionally 
tasked to chair the Foreign Affairs Council. This demanding job profile led scholars 
and observers to argue for the establishment of deputies, without which this position 
would be unmanageable.  
  Given that the Treaty of Lisbon does not include an explicit provision that 
would allow for the HR/VP’s deputisation, this paper in a first step aims to assess what 
the legal possibilities and constraints with regard to the setting up of a deputisation 
system are. Taking into account that the HR/VP interacts with various actors of the 
institutional environment of the European Union (EU), the paper attempts to find out, 
in a second step, to what extent these actors allow for the HR/VP’s deputisation. 
Finally, it examines how the HR/VP’s replacement is assured inside and outside the EU 
in practice and to what extent those arrangements can be considered as efficient.  
  An application of different interpretation methods to the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU)  will  first  demonstrate  that  the teleological approach  offers the most 
convincing arguments in order to argue for the lawfulness of deputies in EU primary 
law. As to the second research aim, an analysis of Rules of Procedures and political 
declarations will find that the environment – if at all – rather allows for other forms of 
the HR/VP’s replacement than deputisation by a person, who is placed under her 
authority. Ultimately, it will be shown that the lack of legal provisions is compensated 
by the expedient prioritisation of meetings by the HR/VP as well as by the establish-
ment of practices which consist in forms of replacement but – to an increasing extent 
– also in deputisation, and which are subject to constant enhancements. The paper 
will conclude by advocating the expansion of such practices to other cases where 
the HR/VP’s replacement has to be assured, and most notably to the Commission, 
where the disadvantages of no deputisation prove to be intolerably high.  
 Martin Schmid 
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1.   Introduction:  The  ‘impossible job’  of the HR/VP  as a  downside of 
bridging institutional divides 
  The Treaty of Amsterdam established the post of the Secretary General of the 
Council of the European Union/High Representative (SG/HR) for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),1  intending “to increase the effectiveness and 
visibility”2 of this policy area. However, this innovation did not address the problem of 
cross-pillar incoherence, resulting from the Maastricht Treaty’s pillar-structure, which 
created an artificial division between CFSP (‘pillar II’) and other – mainly economic –
“aspects of external policy”3  which remained within ‘pillar I’  of  the European 
Community (EC).4  This institutional divide, including its diverging decision-making 
procedures, are still maintained under the actual Treaty of Lisbon,5 which therefore 
only formally abolishes the pillar structure.6 
On an institutional level, the Lisbon Treaty tries to meet the concerns of cross-
pillar incoherence by combining the “post of the High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy”7  with that of the hitherto External Relations 
Commissioner; the Treaty of Lisbon institutes the position of the High Representative 
for CFSP, who is at the same time Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP).8 As the 
current office holder, Baroness Catherine Ashton, is additionally tasked to chair the 
Foreign Affairs Council9 (FAC) – a duty that was assured by the rotating Presidency 
before10 – the new position of the HR/VP “fulfils a bridging function between both, 
these EU institutions and the different dimensions of EU external relations”.11  
                                                 
1 C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, “Common Foreign and Security Policy – A Political Framework for 
EU External Action?”, in C. Bretherton & J. Vogler (eds.), The European Union as a Global 
Actor, London, Routledge, 2006, 2nd edn., pp. 168-169. 
2 Ibid., p. 168. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See art. 24 (1) par. 2 TEU, European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of 13 December 2007”, 
Official Journal of the European Union, C 115, 9 May 2008 [Hereafter, all articles followed 
exclusively by the abbreviations “TEU” or “TFEU” refer to the “Consolidated Versions 2007”]. 
6 J. Wouters, D. Coppens & B. De Meester, “The European Union’s External Relations after the 
Lisbon Treaty”, in S. Griller & J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism Without a 
Constitutional Treaty?, Vienna, Springer, 2008, p. 148. 
7 S. Vanhoonacker & N. Reslow, “The European External Action Service: Living Forwards by 
Understanding Backwards”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 2010, p. 2. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Art. 18 (3) TEU. 
10 J.C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, p. 244. 
11 Vanhoonacker & Reslow, op.cit., p. 2. EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2012 
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Given that these three posts (frequently also referred to as “hats”12) were 
assumed by three different individuals under the former Treaty of Nice,13 it is obvious 
that the HR/VP faces a very tight agenda.14  Moreover, it lies in the nature of a 
Foreign Minister’s office that it demands a lot of travelling and presence abroad, 
which is also true for the HR/VP.15 These two aspects led many scholars to judge the 
HR/VP’s job description as impossible.16 Consequently, the establishment of a system 
of deputisation was broadly suggested in order to allow for a delegation of certain 
duties and to guarantee an efficient performance of all the tasks incumbent upon 
this position.17 
The Treaty of Lisbon, however, “does not provide for deputies having the same 
[…] responsibilities”,18 and thus seems to neglect the risk of underachievement, which 
might undermine the aspired effects of the institutional reforms. This risk has until now 
been realised in so far as Lady Ashton, during her first year in office was criticised for 
having been absent from important meetings19 as well as for her poor attendance 
record of weekly Commission College meetings.20  
In the face of the “urgent need”21 for a structure of deputisation, a thorough 
analysis of how the HR/VP’s replacement can be and is assured is considered more 
than appropriate. Therefore, the paper’s research objective is a threefold one: first, 
given the evident prerequisite that any system of deputisation has to conform to EU 
primary law, the first step of the analysis is to assess what the legal possibilities and 
                                                 
12 Wouters, Coppens & De Meester, op.cit., p. 150. ; Piris, op.cit., p. 243. 
13 Piris, op.cit., p. 243. 
14 P.M. Kaczynski et al., “The Treaty of Lisbon: A Second Look at the Institutional Innovations”, 
Joint CEPS, EGMONT and EPC Study, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, EGMONT 
Institute & European Policy Centre, September 2010, p. 144. 
15 Piris, op.cit., p. 248. 
16 A. Missiroli in “Solana Leaves Ashton Impossible Job Description”, Euractiv, 10 December 
2009, retrieved 17 March 2011, http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/solana-leaves-ashton-
impossible-job-description/article-188183; Wouters, Coppens & De Meester, op.cit.,  p. 155; 
Kaczynski et al., op.cit., p. 143. 
17 Kaczynski et al., op.cit., pp. 143-144 ; “The EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy”, European Union Centre of North Carolina, 31 March 2010, p. 4, retrieved 17 March 
2011, http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/business_media/businessbriefs/Brief1004-high-
rep.pdf. 
18 Piris, op.cit., p. 249. 
19 D. Charter & G. Keeley, “Baroness Ashton under fire for missing European defence summit”, 
The Times, 26 February 2010, retrieved 17 March 2011, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ 
news/world/europe/article7041984.ece. 
20 B. Waterfield, “Is absent Ashton a part-timer?”, EUObserver, 10 January 2011, retrieved 17 
March 2011, http://blogs.euobserver.com/waterfield/2011/01/10/absent-ashton-a-part-time-
eu-foreign-minister.  
21 Kaczynski et al., op.cit., p. 144. Martin Schmid 
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constraints with regard to the setting up of a deputisation system are. To this end, 
established interpretation methods will be applied to find out how the provisions of 
the Treaty of Lisbon concerning the HR/VP have to be interpreted in order to argue in 
favour of the lawfulness of deputisation.  
Second, by assuming her functions,  the HR/VP presents herself before the 
European Parliament, the European Council, the Council as well as the Commission, 
which means that her  replacement is subject to the procedural requirements of 
these  institutions. Therefore,  another  research aim is to examine the  respective 
provisions in Rules of Procedure as well as political agreements and declarations in 
order to assess to what extent they allow for deputisation.  
Third, a case study will provide for the empirical data necessary to analyse 
how and by whom the replacement of the current officeholder Lady Ashton inside 
and outside the EU is arranged in practice and to what extent these arrangements 
can be considered as efficient.  
As to the key concepts of this analysis, the HR/VPs position is in the literature 
either characterised as being ‘double-hatted’, when referring to the idea that it joins 
together the post of the former HR/SG (Council) with the post of the Commissioner 
for External Relations22  or ‘triple-hatted’, if the presiding over the FAC itself  is also 
counted.23 This paper adopts the concept of ‘triple-hatting’ since such a reading 
facilitates to reveal the different ways of replacement that are applied to the 
particular posts. Moreover, for the sake of semantic clarity, the notion of ‘position’ will 
exclusively be used to refer to the entity of the HR/VP. In contrast, the term ‘hat’ will 
be used as an equivalent of ‘post’, and  one ‘hat’ (or ‘post’) can itself comprise 
various ‘functions’ or ‘tasks’.  
Two further associated concepts are those of ‘replacement’ and ‘deputisa-
tion’. ‘Replacement’ denotes all cases where a natural person, regardless of his or 
her institutional belonging, assumes ‘functions’, which the Lisbon Treaty assigns to the 
HR/VP in the  absence of the office holder. In contrast to this, ‘deputisation’  is 
characterised by the formal delegation of authority, enabling the deputy to express 
him- or herself on behalf of the HR/VP and thus implies a relation of hierarchy. Its 
pragmatic aspect denotes both, a minimum of scope of action as well as largely the 
same procedural rights granted to the HR/VP by the respective environment. Being 
                                                 
22 Wouters, Coppens & De Meester, op.cit., p. 151. 
23  J. De Ruyt, “A Minister for a European Foreign Policy”, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies Policy Paper, no. 5/03, Florence, European University Institute, November 
2005, p. 15. EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2012 
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thus  one  particular way of ‘replacement’, ‘deputisation’ is favoured in  this paper 
over other forms of ‘replacement’ because of the existence of a chain of command, 
which allows the HR/VP to instruct the ‘deputy’ and hence to ensure that her position 
is perfectly upheld, which is not the case as to ‘replacement’. 
Finally, the notion of ‘efficiency’ denominates the need for all forms of 
‘replacement’ to be organised in a way which assures that the entirety of ‘tasks’ 
incumbent on the HR/VP can be assumed to their fullest extent. 
After a brief job description of the HR/VP’s ‘position’  in  the next section, 
starting from art. 18 TEU and pointing out the ‘tasks’ performed under each ‘hat’, 
each of the research questions will be dealt with in a separate section. The argument 
put forward in answer to the first research aim is that compared to a historical or a 
systematic interpretation of the TEU, a teleological approach – although not without 
frictions – is most appropriate to make a case for deputies’ legality in EU primary law. 
Second,  other  actors of the EU’s institutional environment constrain the HR/VP’s 
‘deputisation’  in so far as in their Rules of Procedure or in political agreements 
allowance is made rather for different forms of ‘replacement’ while ‘deputisation’ 
proves to be an exception. Third and finally, it is shown that in order to manage the 
challenging agenda, the absence of a  formal legal basis for ‘deputisation’ is 
compensated in practice by the prioritisation of meetings and the establishment of 
informal practices  consisting of different forms of ‘replacement’, including 
‘deputisation’. Interestingly, these practices, which are subject to constant advance-
ment,  do not necessarily have to fully correspond to the provisions examined 
beforehand and increasingly grant ‘deputisation’ a right to exist among other forms 
‘replacement’, which is advocated by this paper. 
2.   The ‘hats’ and ‘functions’ of the HR/VP 
Compared to the role of the former HR/SG,  the ‘tasks’ incumbent on the 
HR/VP under her ‘High Representative hat’ were significantly upgraded by the Lisbon 
Treaty.24  This becomes apparent when reading art.  18(2) TEU, which tasks her to 
“conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy […as well as] the 
common defence and security policy”.25 She does so by submitting proposals to the 
                                                 
24 Wouters, Coppens & De Meester, op.cit., n. 30, p. 151. 
25 Art. 18(2) TEU. Martin Schmid 
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Council or European Council26 and carrying out decisions taken by the Council.27 
Furthermore, when putting into effect28 the CFSP, she is responsible for “[ensuring] the 
unity, consistency and effectiveness”29 of the Union’s action. It is important to note 
that the HR/VP has a “right of initiative both, as HR only (in strictly CFSP matters) and 
as double-hatted VP”30 for external relation matters managed by the Commission.31 
Moreover, as the HR/SG before,32 she conducts ministerial political dialogues 
with third parties.33 The innovation is that now she is able to interact with a third party 
alone not only for CFSP matters but also for Commission issues of external relations.34 
The HR/VP also presides over the Union’s Special Representatives (EUSR).35 
Additionally, she exercises authority over the European External Action Service 
(EEAS).36 As the EEAS is mandated to assist the HR/VP with regard to all of her tasks,37 
this ‘function’ cannot exclusively be assigned to this ‘hat’. Another assignment 
brought about by the Lisbon Treaty is that the HR/VP “shall take part in the work [of 
the European Council]”,38 although she is not a member of it and is not entitled to 
cast a vote.39 
Having taken a number of responsibilities in the field of the Union’s external 
relations from the rotating Presidency of the Council, the Lisbon Treaty now calls on 
the HR/VP to “represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and 
security policy”40 and to “express the Union’s position in international organisations 
and at international conferences”,41  which includes the United  Nations  Security 
                                                 
26 D. Chalmers, G. Davies & G. Monti, European Union Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, 2nd edn., p. 64. 
27 Art. 18(2) TEU. 
28 Art. 24(1) par. 2.  
29 Art. 26(2) par. 2 TEU. 
30 Kaczynski et al., op.cit., p. 143. 
31 De Ruyt, “A Minister for a European Foreign Policy”, op.cit., p. 15. 
32 Piris, op.cit., p. 244. 
33 Art. 27(2) TEU. 
34 De Ruyt, “A Minister for a European Foreign Policy”, op.cit., p. 15. 
35 Chalmers, Davies & Monti, op.cit., p. 64 ; and art. 33 TEU. 
36 Piris, op.cit., p. 247. 
37 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (2010/427/EC) of 26 July 2010 establishing 
the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, L 201/30, 3 August 2010, p. 32. 
38 Art. 15(2) TEU. 
39 Wouters, Coppens & De Meester, op.cit., p. 152. 
40 Art. 27(2) TEU. 
41 Ibid. EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2012 
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Council.42 It is important to note here that she exercises her representational duties 
only on ministerial level since the Treaty states that it is up to the President of the 
European Council to represent the Union in CFSP matters on the level of Heads of 
State or Government.43 
In addition, the HR/VP takes over the ‘tasks’ to “negotiate international 
agreements relating exclusively or principally to CFSP matters on behalf of the 
Union”44 as well as to assume consultation and information duties on CFSP matters 
towards the European Parliament.45  
Finally,  contrary to the accumulation of tasks  on one single individual, it is 
worth noting that the Lisbon Treaty relieved the HR/VP of the duty of the Secretary-
General of the Council of the EU.46  
As to her ‘Council-hat’, art. 18(3) TEU determines that she shall preside over the 
FAC.47 In respect of the ‘Commission hat’, the Treaty provides that the HR/VP “shall 
be one of the Vice-Presidents”48  of the Commission. Within this institution, she is 
responsible for “handling external relations”49 and “for coordinating other aspects of 
the Union’s external action”.50 Although the HR/VP is thus expected to fulfil a bridge-
building function between those Commissioners dealing with “different aspects of 
the external policies”,51  the TEU does  not equip the HR/VP with procedural 
prerogatives (e.g. a formal hierarchy among Commissioners) to facilitate this task.52 
Hence, it is ultimately up to “the President of the Commission (and the College as a 
whole)”53 to effectuate consistency of all EU external policies. 
Vice versa, the somewhat cryptic formula of art. 18(4) s. 4 TEU ensures that the 
HR/VP will “not […] be forced to renounce the position [she] defends, if this position 
                                                 
42 Art. 34(2) par. 3 TEU. 
43 Art. 15(2) TEU, Art. 15(6) par. 2 TEU. 
44 Piris, op.cit., p. 246. 
45 Art. 36 par. 1 TEU. 
46 Kaczynski et al., op.cit., p. 143. 
47 Art. 18(3) TEU. 
48 Art. 18(4) s. 1 TEU. 
49 C. Kaddous, “Role and Position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy under the Lisbon Treaty”, in S. Griller & J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty: EU 
Constitutionalism Without a Constitutional Treaty?, Vienna, Springer, 2008, p. 212. 
50 Art. 18(4) s. 3 TEU. 
51 D. Allen, “So who will speak for Europe? The Constitutional Treaty and coherence in the EU 
external relations”, CFSP Forum, no. 5, 2004, p. 2, cited in Wouters, Coppens & De Meester, 
op.cit., p. 154. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. Martin Schmid 
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comes from” one of her other two CFSP-related  ‘hats’.54  This  could theoretically 
happen if the HR/VP was “sidelined”55 by a decision taken collectively in the College 
through formal voting56 – based on simple majority.57  
In sum, three findings deserve being kept at the back of the mind throughout 
the analysis: First, apart from the considerable number of ‘tasks’, their great variety 
deserves closer attention.  The fact that the different ‘functions’ may have a 
representative role (e.g. political dialogue), an initiating role (FAC), a coordinating 
role  (Commission),  a  consensus-building  role  (FAC) as well as a  managerial or 
operational (within the EEAS) nature could have implications on how the HR/VP’s 
‘replacement’ is assured and by whom. Second, the ‘tasks’ of third party dialogue, 
the negotiation of international agreements and the right of initiative can be 
exercised under both, her ‘HR hat’ and her ‘Commission hat’, and the EEAS assists 
the HR/VP in all tasks irrespective of the ‘hat’. This specific feature could be relevant 
in so far as the form of ‘replacement’ could depend on the policy area in question. 
Third, nearly all ‘tasks’ imply meetings that require the HR/VP’s personal attendance 
within EU institutions, abroad in third countries and before international organisations. 
Since  she is thus  regularly moving in a foreign environment,  it  depends on those 
actors’ rules and procedures whether and to what extent ‘replacement’ or even 
‘deputisation’ is allowed. 
The next section analyses to what extent the Treaty of Lisbon itself allows for 
the HR/VP’s ‘deputisation’. 
3.   Deputisation and the EU legal order: possibilities and constraints  
In order to answer  the question of deputies’ legality,  the TEU is  interpreted 
according to the interpretation methods regularly applied by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ). Those methods, which are equally drawn on by national courts,58 are 
notably the “grammatical, historical, systematic and teleological interpretation of a 
                                                 
54 De Ruyt, “A Minister for a European Foreign Policy”, op.cit., p. 19. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 European Commission, “Commission Decision (2010/138/EU, Euratom) of 24 February 2010 
amending its Rules of Procedures”, Official Journal of the European Union, L55, 5 March 2010, 
p. 62, art. 8(3).  
58 L.N. Brown & T. Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2000, 5th edn., p. 323. EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2012 
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norm”.59 As a grammatical interpretation, which relies on the “words of the text”60 in 
question, is inapplicable due to a lack of an explicit legal basis, the conduct of a 
historical interpretation is next in line in the subsequent section.  
3.1  The HR/VP’s deputies: a feature lost on the way to the Constitutional Treaty?  
Historical interpretation usually aims to reveal “the subjective intention of the 
author of the text”,61 notably by focusing on the preparatory work,62 which denotes 
“written documents reflecting the attitude of the negotiators of the Treaties from their 
inception to their conclusion”.63 Although the doctrine until recently considered this 
method as “impermissible in Union law owing to the lack of publication of the 
travaux préparatoires”,64 this opinion can no longer be upheld due to the innovation 
that the preparatory materials of the Constitutional Treaty as well as the documents 
produced during the Convention on the Future of Europe were ’published’.65 Despite 
certain objections on the part of the ECJ to this method,66 an examination of the 
respective preparatory materials  will contribute to understand whether ‘deputies’ 
were considered at all, how they were institutionally conceptualised and for what 
reason they were not considered in the Lisbon Treaty.  
When talking about preparatory material of the Lisbon Treaty, one has to be 
aware of the fact  that  the  Treaty text concerning  foreign policy was,  to a 
considerable extent, taken over word by word from the Constitutional Treaty – after 
its rejection in May and June 200567 – and incorporated in the Reform Treaty,68 which 
became known as Lisbon Treaty.  
Given this development, the quest for provisions with regard to ‘deputies’ for 
the then ‘Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’ (UMFA) – as the ‘HR/VP’ was originally 
                                                 
59  P. Dann, “Thoughts on a Methodology of European Constitutional Law”, German Law 
Journal, vol. 6, no. 11, 2005, p. 1462. 
60 Ibid., p. 324. 
61 Ibid., p. 330.   
62 Ibid. 
63 A. Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law, Amsterdam, North Holland, 
1979, p. 57. 
64 Dann, “Thoughts on a Methodology”, op.cit., p. 1463. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Brown & Kennedy, op.cit., pp. 330, 332. 
67  N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010, 7th edn., p. 76. 
68 S. Keukeleire & J. MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 63. Martin Schmid 
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called69 – has to focus on the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe, the 
subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2003/2004 and the IGC 2007. 
When considering the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe, it is important 
to emphasise that the Convention assumed only a preparatory task for the later IGC 
and that its members were in no way identical with those of the latter.70 Since it is 
generally at IGCs where member states produce legally binding documents,71 only 
preparatory materials of IGCs mirror the real intention of member states as legitimate 
authors  of the treaties and can thus be subject to a historical interpretation. 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering Convention materials as this will show what forms 
of ‘deputisation’ were devised. 
The Convention opened its proceedings on 28 February 2002 and presented 
the final Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (DTCE) on 18 July 2003.72 
Within the preparatory phase, eleven working groups were set up in order to focus 
on legal and technical problems.73 It was notably Working Group VII, dealing with 
External Action, and Working Group VIII, concentrating on Defence, that discussed 
the shape of a future ‘Union Minister of Foreign Affairs’ and the ‘deputisation’ issue.  
Working Group VII deliberated – among other topics – ways to upgrade the 
HR/SG’s ‘post’ as well as to reflect on adequate “human and financial resources […] 
to match the scale of the [HR/SG’s] task”.74  Already in the  second meeting  the 
question of ‘deputies’ was directly addressed, when the External Relations (RELEX) 
Commissioner Chris Patten75  first raised concerns about the manageability of a 
‘double-hatted’ HR/VP, created by combining the post of the HR with that of the 
RELEX Commissioner.76 This entailed a debate among members of the working group 
about how such a ‘position’ could be designed and notably supported.77 Supporters 
of the idea of ‘double-hatting’ argued that such a ‘position’ could be assisted by 
                                                 
69 Ibid., p. 64. 
70 Nugent, op.cit., p. 69. 
71 Ibid., p. 87. 
72 Ibid., p. 70. 
73 P. Normann, The Accidental Constitution, Brussels, EuroComment, 2005, p. 51. 
74  European Convention, Secretariat, Mandate of Working Group VII on External Action, 
CONV 252/02, Brussels, 10 September 2002, p. 5, retrieved 17 March 2011, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/cv00/cv00252.en02.pdf.  
75 European Convention, Secretariat, Summary of the meeting of Working Group VII held on 8 
October 2002,  CONV 342/02, Brussels, 11 October 2002, p. 5, retrieved 17 March 2011, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/cv00/cv00342.en02.pdf. 
76 European Convention, Summary of the meeting of Working Group VII held on 8 October 
2002, op.cit., p. 5. 
77 Ibid., p. 7. EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2012 
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“two deputies, one of which would focus on the HR role, the other on the 
Commission role”.78  
In the end, the Working Group’s final report  presented  four options for the 
possible institutional relation between the HR and the RELEX Commissioner.79 Apart 
from the first two – rather extreme – options,80 option three suggested the creation of 
a ’European External Representative’ “as a compromise solution”,81  who  would 
combine the functions of the HR and the RELEX Commissioner.82 Moreover, he or she 
would “be appointed by the Council”83  with the consent of the Commission 
President and the European Parliament.84 
Only  this third option provided for the setup of a ‘deputisation’ system, for 
which two alternative designs were suggested: 
1.  Some members advocated putting into place “a number of 
deputies/assistants for CFSP […] who would be nominated by the Council on 
[… the HR’s] proposal and work under […] her authority”.85 At the same time, 
this scenario did not allot ‘deputies’ to the ‘Commission hat’.86 
2.  Others favoured the idea of the HR having exactly two deputies, one of them 
being responsible for CFSP matters and the other one for tasks relating to her 
‘Commission hat’. 87 
Finally, a fourth alternative was introduced.88 This proposal suggested to bring 
into being the office of an ‘EU Minister of Foreign Affairs’ who differed from the 
’European External Representative’  mentioned above  in that he should be 
accountable to the European Council and preside the “external action Council”.89 
This alternative came closest to the ‘position’ of the HR/VP existing today. However, 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79  European Convention, Secretariat, Final Report of Working Group VII, CONV 459/02, 
Brussels, 16 December 2002, pp. 19-23, retrieved 17 March 2011, http://register.consilium. 
europa.eu/pdf/en/02/cv00/cv00459.en02.pdf.  
80 These options consisted notably in maintaining a complete separation of the posts as well 
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although this scenario brings an accumulation of ‘tasks’ to an even larger extent 
than option three, no provisions were made with regard to ‘deputies’.  
Working Group VIII equally discussed how to enhance the “role of the [HR]”,90 
but with regard to EU crisis management.91 In order to achieve more effectiveness in 
this area, some members argued  in favour  “of a Deputy HR responsible for 
Defence”,92 which, however, gave rise to concerns on the part of those who worried 
about the setup of additional “posts”.93 As to the scope of responsibility of a “Deputy 
for Defence”,94  Alain Richard, former French Minister for Defence emphasised the 
necessity for the EU to enhance its military capabilities.95 On the institutional side, he 
advocated notably a Deputy HR, who would be “responsible for the development of 
capabilities”96 and be placed within the “intergovernmental structure of European 
defence policy”.97  Although discussed in several working documents,98  the final 
report of Working Group VIII did not refer in one single clause to a Deputy for 
Defence.99 
After the submission of the final reports of both Working Groups, the ensuing 
plenary session was devoted to discuss their outcomes. Although President Dehaene 
underlined the Working Groups’ preference for option three,100 there was still general 
disagreement which is why it is not surprising that the question of eventual ‘deputies’ 
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was not subject to debate. In the end, the questions of the Minister’s ‘functions’ and 
his/her eventual ‘deputies’ were not addressed any more in the remaining plenary 
sessions,101 and the Convention reached an agreement on the creation of an UMFA 
in art. 27 of the DTCE,102 leaving out provisions for ‘deputisation’. Since art. 23(2) DTCE 
tasks this person to chair the FAC,103 it can be concluded that the plenum in fact 
took over option four of Working Group VII, as outlined above. Although ‘deputies’ 
did  not occur any more as a topic on  the  agenda,  two out of 45 amendments 
overall, brought in by Dirk Roche104 and Danuta Hübner,105 still agitated for respective 
provisions and basically took up the proposals made earlier in Working Group VII. 
  Having retraced the work of the Convention on ’deputisation’ for the 
intended UMFA from the very beginning, it is now possible to draw a number of 
conclusions: First, the creation of ‘deputies’ was in fact deliberated in the Working 
Groups ‘External Action’ as well as ‘Defence’, which were taking into account the 
high workload that would weigh on a single person due to the expected 
combination of the ‘posts’ of the RELEX Commissioner and the HR.  
  Second,  two distinct main conceptions  as to  how future arrangements for 
‘deputisation’ could look like were defended throughout the discussions. Apart from 
the institutionalisation of a particular ‘deputy’ for security and defence policy, the HR 
–  respectively the UMFA –  should either be supported by several ‘deputies’ 
exclusively responsible for CFSP issues or by one ‘deputy’ responsible for CFSP matters 
and another one for duties performed under the ‘Commission hat’.  
  Third, the suggestions for amendments submitted at the plenary level show 
that ‘deputies’ should have been placed in an additional paragraph to art. 27 DTCE, 
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which is relevant in so far as it indicates which article has to be subject to 
interpretation in order to allow for an argumentation in favour of ‘deputisation’. 
  Fourth,  two reasons were provided why ‘deputies’ for the UMFA might not 
have been considered in the DTCE: on the one hand, as highlighted above, Working 
Group VII forwarded four alternatives for the HR’s future job description to the 
plenum,  which then however simply advocated for the creation of an  UMFA, for 
whose ‘position’ no ‘deputies’ were envisaged. On the other hand, it should not be 
neglected that the plenum spent most of its relatively scarce time on discussing 
details about the UMFA’s ‘tasks’ and accountability, on which quite divergent views 
were held. There may simply not have been enough time to sufficiently address the 
question of ‘deputies’,  and it finally may have been disregarded because of its 
relatively minor importance.  
  Apart from the analysis of the documents produced during the Convention, 
the  work of the subsequent IGCs was  equally  scrutinised in the context of the 
research for this paper. However, with regard to the IGC 2003/2004, no evidence 
was found  that  the issue of ‘deputies’ for the UMFA had  come up during  these 
negotiations.106 Concerning the IGC 2007, the only notable modification as to this 
contribution was the renaming of the UMFA as High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,107 whereas ‘deputies’ for this ‘position’ had not 
been discussed at all.108  
Beyond the IGCs, ‘deputies’ and the entourage of the ‘Minister’ were not 
discussed among member states until 2008,109 as it was agreed that this “decision […] 
should be made only after the entry into force of the Treaty [of Lisbon]”.110 However, 
after the Treaty’s signature, during the Slovenian Presidency of 2008, it was 
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considered that the “issue of deputies to the HR had been settled by the Convention 
and that it could not be relaunched”[sic].111 
  At last, given that the screening of IGC documents did not reveal the merest 
hint which would permit to assume that it was the intention of the Constitutional 
Treaty’s authors to establish ‘deputies’ for the newly created UMFA, it has to be 
concluded that an argumentation in favour of ‘deputisation’ cannot be built upon a 
historical interpretation of the Constitutional Treaty. On the other hand, however, no 
evidence was found that the establishment of ‘deputies’ was considered as strictly 
illegitimate or forbidden. This conclusion is of considerable relevance for the further 
analysis, since it excludes that the lack of regulation of ‘deputies’ is an intended gap 
in EU legislation, which would preclude its filling by means of interpretation.  
  Consequently, the next section seeks to find out to what extent a systematic 
interpretation provides for an argument for the legality of ‘deputies’. 
3.2  Article 18 TEU in relation to the Treaty’s  legal framework: a  systematic 
approach  
  Being the  most frequently applied method  by the ECJ,112  a systematic 
interpretation  –  also referred to as contextual interpretation113  –  consists in the 
placing  of  the word, paragraph or article in question114  “in its context and [in 
interpreting] it [either] in relation to”115  the surrounding text of the word, other 
“paragraphs of the article or to other articles of the same section”.116 It may also be 
that the ECJ “refers to other parts of the Treaty or the Treaty as a whole”.117 Having 
demonstrated above that ‘deputisation’  would have been  probably  framed in 
today’s art. 18 TEU, this article shall now be subject to further interpretation. As none 
of the paragraphs in art.  18 TEU  explicitly refers  to ‘deputies’ or concedes to the 
HR/VP an authorisation or responsibility that would imply the capacity to set up a 
‘deputisation’ arrangement, the examination of the surrounding articles within Title III 
TEU, dealing with institutions, is next in line. Here, the immediately preceding art. 17 
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TEU appears particularly relevant since its (6) includes provisions with regard to the 
President of the Commission. Within the Treaty of Lisbon, this position – aside from the 
President of the European Council –  is the most evident point of reference when 
trying to make any kind of “deductions”118 to the HR/VP’s profile because they bear 
several – albeit broad – resemblances to each other: First, in terms of their institutional 
importance in the Lisbon Treaty’s legal framework, due to the entirety of their ‘tasks’ 
throughout the Treaty as well as their various entanglements in relevant decision-
making processes, the President of the Commission and the HR/VP are silhouetted 
against the other few individuals that are designated by the TEU – irrespective of the 
President of the European Council. Second, both assume tasks of a similar nature, 
internally (e.g. chairing the  College,119  respectively  the  Council120) as well as 
externally, given that, for example, together with the President of the European 
Council they form the “new troika” of the EU’s external representation.121 
  Having justified the reasons for this attempted legal deduction, (6) of art. 17 
TEU shall be discussed: While lit. a) can be disregarded in this particular case, lit. b) 
gives the President of the Commission the right to “decide on the internal 
organisation of the Commission, ensuring that it acts […] efficiently”,122  meaning 
notably the allocation and reshuffling of portfolios.123 Thus, it can be stated that the 
President has an organisational or ‘institutional capacity’ at least in so far as it allows 
him to shape the internal organisation in a way that the ‘tasks’ of the institution, for 
which he is responsible, are assumed in an efficient way. Given that the HR/VP’s 
‘tasks’ are at least not less comprehensive and important as those of the President of 
the Commission, it should be valid to argue that a similar degree of institutional 
capacity should be conceded  to the HR/VP with regard to her own internal 
organisation. How, for example, can it otherwise be imagined that her coordination 
‘function’ within the College124 would be fulfilled efficiently if she cannot attend a 
meeting and is at the same time unable to send a ‘deputy’? Thus, granting the 
HR/VP sufficient institutional capacity with regard to her own internal organisation, 
including notably the appointment of ‘deputies’, could prevent such situations and 
ensure the efficient assumption of her various ‘tasks’.  
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  That the right to ‘deputisation’ could indeed be  comprised by such an 
institutional capacity is demonstrated by art. 17(6) lit. c) TEU, by which the President 
of the Commission is entitled to “appoint Vice-Presidents […] from among the 
members of the Commission”.125 Reading this provision together with art. 25 of the 
Commission Rules of Procedure, according to which the President’s “functions shall 
be exercised by one of the Vice-Presidents […] in the order laid down by the 
President”126  in case of his absence, it can be concluded that the President is 
enabled to choose the Commissioner who shall deputise for him. Given that this 
Commissioner is at least to some extent placed under the authority of the President, 
in view of the latter’s prerogatives,127 one can indeed speak about ‘deputisation’ in 
this case, which is confirmed by the headline of art. 25 of the Rules of Procedure.128 
  It is worth noting here that the above argument of considering the HR/VP not 
as a physical person can equally be found in the literature. For instance, Chalmers et 
al. argue that “whilst the HR/VP is presented as person, it could equally be thought of 
as an organisation”.129 
  The entire argument, however, implies necessarily that the HR/VP is not purely 
read as a single physical person but as an institutional entity, or organisation itself, 
which is problematic in so far as art. 13(1) TEU determines the “Union’s institutions”130 
expressly and exhaustively, thereby not mentioning the HR/VP.  
  A further and simpler argument in support of the above takes into account the 
whole set of articles within the framework of Title III TEU. Therein, each article in 
principle comprises the entire core rules and ‘tasks’ for one particular institution, and 
art. 18 TEU, in fact, does the same with regard to the HR/VP. Moreover, both the 
preceding as well as the article following  art.  18 TEU establish foundations of 
European institutions.131 In the light of this legal environment and the fact that the 
HR/VP also has its own article, it would only be logical to place the HR/VP on equal 
footing with the European  Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
Commission and the Court of Justice in terms of institutional status. However, this 
argument, aiming equally at acknowledging the HR/VP as an organisation, faces the 
same valid objection, based on art. 13 TEU, as the above. 
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  Having presented ways to argue in favour of the legality of the establishment 
of ‘deputies’ for the HR/VP – albeit not without frictions – the following subsection will 
verify whether a teleological interpretation will result in a less contested outcome.  
3.3  No ‘deputies’, no consistency and effectiveness: does a teleological 
interpretation help? 
  Teleological interpretation is “based on the purpose or object of the text 
facing the judge”132 and often applied in combination with the contextual method. 
It draws upon the idea that “Treaties mainly provide a broad programme”133 that 
might lead to further integration “rather than a detailed blueprint”.134 Being under-
stood as a way to respond to “changing economic, political and social”135 circum-
stances, this method better takes into account the “[dynamic character] of 
European integration”136 and at the same time contributes to the dynamic nature of 
EU law itself.137 
  Objectives found in “opening articles” of the Treaty as well as “titles, chapters 
and headings” are central ’elements’  in the application of the teleological 
method.138 In the case at hand, art. 13(1) TEU sets out the objectives of Title III on the 
institutions. Among the objectives, common to all institutions is most notably the aim 
to “ensure the consistency [and] effectiveness […] of [the Union’s] policies”,139 which 
– in case of the HR/VP – are the policies relating to the Union’s external action. It can 
be argued that without ‘deputies’ the HR/VP is not, or only to an insufficient extent, 
able to assure the consistency and effectiveness of the EU’s external action. Using 
the example above, how can one imagine that the HR/VP without deputies is able 
to assume effectively her coordination function in the Commission according to art. 
18(4) TEU, by which she ought to ensure the consistency of the Unions external 
action? Given that the Treaty is silent about ‘deputies’, the legal order as laid down 
by the Treaty has to be considered as “unsuitable to the [objective] sought to be 
achieved”.140  Therefore, in view of this insufficiency, art.  18 TEU should not be 
interpreted as forbidding the creation of ‘deputies’ because their establishment 
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would effectively contribute to make the system work in a more  consistent and 
efficient way. 
However, the application of the teleological method is not entirely 
unproblematic. First, it should not be disregarded that the teleological method was 
particularly “appropriate in [former]  Community law”,141  especially  with regard to 
economic law, in the context of which it was developed.142 It is at least questionable 
whether the teleological method can be applied in the same dynamic way to 
purely institutional provisions of today’s TEU, as it was used for interpreting mainly 
single market law so far. Second, resorting to a teleological interpretation in order to 
argue in favour of ‘deputies’ legality cannot effectively refute the above objection 
that again, in this case the HR/VP can hardly be read as a physical person but must 
rather be seen as an organisation.  
Nevertheless,  it should be uncontested that the outcome of this method 
represents a pragmatic response to the challenge, which is posed by the job profile 
of art. 18 TEU. 
Given the absence of ‘deputies’ in EU primary law, it is assumed that mainly 
other forms of ‘replacement’ are in place. These forms might be laid down in 
secondary EU law as well as political agreements, which will be examined in the next 
section.  
4.   The arrangements for ‘replacement’ of the HR/VP in her relations to EU 
institutions 
4.1   European Parliament 
The HR/VP’s relation to the European  Parliament  with regard to her 
‘replacement’ is dominated by the question of her political accountability and 
framed by four documents. These are in particular the TEU itself,143 the Declaration by 
the HR/VP on Political Accountability,144 the Inter-institutional Agreement between 
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the European Parliament and the Commission145 and the Rules of Procedure of the 
Council of the European Union.146 
The TEU links the ‘position’ of the HR/VP and the European Parliament notably 
in its art. 17, where (8) TEU gives the European Parliament the power to dismiss the 
HR/VP, however, only with regard to her ‘Commission hat’.147 On the contrary, the 
European Parliament’s powers in relation to the CFSP area are basically scaled down 
to “advisory, monitoring and holding-to-account roles”.148 In this regard, art. 36 TEU 
lays down the HR/VP’s accountability by stipulating that the HR/VP has to “regularly 
consult the [European  Parliament] on the main aspects […] of [CFSP]”149  and to 
assure that the European Parliament’s positions are “taken into consideration”.150 The 
assurance of this  accountability  has been a major concern of the European 
Parliament since the importance of the new ‘position’ of the UMFA began to appear 
during the Convention on the Future of Europe. Therein, respective institutional 
provisions were suggested at the  level  of  working groups151  as well as at plenary 
level.152 
More recently, during the process of shaping the form of the EEAS, the 
European Parliament was in doubt that the HR/VP – given her multiple ‘tasks’ – would 
manage to sufficiently “report back on her actions”.153  Therefore, the European 
Parliament  requested a ‘replacement’  system  stating that for  issues  related to 
external relations handled by the Commission, the HR/VP should be replaced by the 
Commissioner in charge of the respective dossier.154 As to intergovernmental policy 
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areas, member states should nominate “people from the Council”155 who could be 
subject to  reporting duties towards their domestic parliaments. By contrast, the 
European Parliament deemed EU “officials”156 inappropriate for this ‘task’ because of 
a lack of direct accountability towards a parliamentary assembly.157 
The Declaration by the HR/VP on Political Accountability effectively complies 
with these requests. Its (6) determines that if the HR/VP should be unable to attend a 
plenary session, it is left to her discretion to decide whom to send to the European 
Parliament.158  This discretion is only restricted by the issue in question in so far as 
‘replacement’ will be assured “by a Commissioner for issues falling exclusively or 
prevailingly into Commission competence”.159 In case the issue “[falls] exclusively or 
principally in the area of CFSP”,160 it is either “the rotating Presidency”161 or one of the 
other two Ministers forming together with the rotating Presidency the “trio 
[Presidency]”.162 
Apart from the provisions in the Declaration on Political Accountability, the 
HR/VP is equally subject to the rules of the Inter-institutional Agreement between the 
European Parliament and the European Commission due to her ‘Commission hat’. 
Art. 45 par. 2 establishes indeed the principle that members of the Commission “shall 
ensure [their presence] at plenary sittings for agenda items falling under their 
responsibility whenever the Parliament so requests”163 but is silent about the question 
of an eventual ‘replacement’ or ‘deputisation’. Only on the level of parliamentary 
committee meetings, art. 50 par. 3 mentions that when a Commissioner’s presence 
“is not explicitly required”,164 the Commission is asked to send “a competent official 
at an appropriate level”.165 Since the provision does not further specify the official’s 
status, and given that the former DG RELEX and parts of DG Development were 
integrated in the EEAS,166  it seems only logical that this can equally be an EEAS 
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official, if the respective issue falls within the competence of the EEAS. This would 
then in fact result in ‘deputisation’. 
Finally, art. 26 par. 2 of the Council Rules of Procedures even increases the 
HR/VP’s  burden by making her  responsible to “represent [the FAC] before the 
[European  Parliament] or its committees”.167  While for plenary meetings of the 
European  Parliament,  the HR/VP can ask the rotating Presidency to ensure her 
replacement, she can instruct senior officials of the EEAS or the General Secretariat 
to represent the FAC in committee meetings.168 As the Council Rules of Procedure 
were adopted on 1 December 2009 – at a time when the final shape of an EEAS was 
not yet decided upon169 – and since parts of the Council Secretariat were transferred 
to the EEAS,170 it can well be that an EEAS official is to represent the FAC before a 
European Parliament committee, which would again add up to ‘deputisation’. 
In sum, with regard to European Parliament plenary sessions the choice was 
made for ‘replacement’ instead of ‘deputisation’, whereas on the level of European 
Parliament committee meetings ‘deputisation’ can effectively occur.  
4.2  European Council and Council of the EU 
With regard to the European Council, neither the Lisbon Treaty nor the Rules of 
Procedure of the European Council comprehend rules stipulating whether or how to 
‘replace’ the HR/VP in case of her absence. This lack of provisions can be explained 
by two reasons. First, she is not a full member but only invited to “take part in its 
work”,171  which means that her absence is not an obstacle for convening the 
European Council. Second, the European Council meets at  Heads of State or 
Government level,172 which implies that the HR/VP herself, who acts and represents 
on  ministerial level,  is hierarchically subordinated to all other participants of the 
European Council. Thus, there is simply no personality left that could adequately 
‘replace’ her. 
The HR/VP’s ‘replacement’ as chair of the FAC is a clear-cut case: the Council 
Rules of Procedure determine expressly in art. 2(5) par. 2 that in the event of her 
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impediment, the HR/VP is to be ’replaced’ by the rotating Presidency.173 Thus, the 
Council does not provide for an opportunity to ‘deputise’ for the HR/VP. 
4.3  European Commission 
As to the European Commission, ‘replacement’ provisions are laid down in its 
Rules of Procedure  and further detailed in the Decision of the President of the 
European Commission on the organisation of responsibilities of the Members of the 
Commission. In art. 25 of the Rules of Procedure, the President of the Commission is 
granted the right that in the event of his absence his “function […] shall be exercised 
by one of the Vice-Presidents […] in the order  laid down by the President”.174 
However, there is no comparable provision with regard to absences of the HR/VP. 
Very interestingly, the Decision of the Commission President in its art. 3 par. 1 s. 2 takes 
explicitly into account “the specific functions of the [HR/VP], notably in the 
Council”,175 but only in the context of relieving her of the burden of ‘replacing’ “the 
President in his absence”.176 On the contrary, it does not provide for a rule allowing 
for her to be ‘replaced’ either. 
In addition,  art.  5(3)  of  the  Rules of Procedure imposes the principle of 
mandatory attendance at weekly College meetings on Commissioners, from which, 
however, they can be exempted from by the President.177 Indeed, art. 10(2) permits 
that in this case an absent Commissioner can send his or her Head of Cabinet to the 
meeting,178 which would thus suggest the possibility of ‘deputisation’. However, the 
paragraph at the same time delimits the rights of the supposed ‘deputy’ by only 
granting him the right to state the view of the absent Commissioner, if the President 
asks him to do so.179 Thus, since the Head of Cabinet does not enjoy the same rights 
(e.g. the right to cast a vote180)  as the Commissioner,  it is not a case of 
‘deputisation’. Given this rigid procedural framework, one may rightly wonder how, 
in the case of Ashton’s absence,  her Head of Cabinet can ever be able to 
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effectively defend her position, let alone to coordinate positions of Commissioners 
who are responsible for policy areas related to external relations.  
This  section  has  shown that the extent to which the HR/VP is allowed to 
‘deputise’ or ‘replace’ in case of her absence differs from one institution to another 
and is thus dependent on the environment. Moreover, it has to be admitted that 
‘replacement’ is not in all cases possible and ‘deputisation’ quasi inexistent. The next 
section will verify whether and to what extent the HR/VP’s ‘replacement’ in practice 
is in line with the formal provisions that have just been expounded.  
5.   The  HR/VP’s ‘replacement’ in practice: The consequences  of no 
'deputisation' in- and outside the European Union 
5.1  European Parliament 
According to EEAS officials, the HR/VP’s ‘replacement’ within the European 
Parliament in practice works in principle according to the Declaration on Political 
Accountability.181  One  small  difference in practice, compared to the document, 
however, is that it was originally decided that if the rotating Presidency ‘replaces’ 
Ashton before the plenary of the European  Parliament, the respective Minister  is 
accompanied by the Executive Secretary-General of the EEAS, Pierre Vimont.182 The 
advantage seen in this established practice by both, the European Parliament as 
well as the HR/VP, is that on the one hand, Vimont is directly responsible to Ashton 
and thus institutionally closer to her than the rotating Presidency.183  On the other 
hand, he regularly attends  the FAC meetings with  Ashton, which makes  him 
particularly able to report about developments in the FAC.184 Given that Vimont is a 
direct subordinate to Ashton, this case can effectively  be considered as 
‘deputisation’. 
At a certain point in time, however, this arrangement reached its limits and 
needed an upgrade. When it turned out that the HR/VP did not manage to present 
herself before the European Parliament twice a month due to her agenda, the Polish 
Presidency, more precisely its Minister of Foreign Affairs,  was confronted with 
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handling  those  meetings  additionally.185  Although the Polish pretended not to 
consider assuming this 'task' on a regular basis, they were unable to hand over this 
considerable workload since the European Parliament does  not accept to be 
briefed only by Vimont  as an official, given that it  requests  the presence of a 
politician.186;  In order not to end up in the  uncomfortable situation of  the  Polish 
Presidency, who had to stand in before plenary sessions at short notice and with a 
minimum of briefing, the current  Danish  Presidency  has  backed up the Polish 
pretention by establishing basic conditions that have to be met if they  take over the 
HR/VP’s responsibilities before the European Parliament.187 Today, those conditions 
notably consist in stating a formal request within a certain early warning threshold, 
forwarding all necessary files and giving a debriefing beforehand by the EEAS and, 
finally, ensuring a personal assistance to the Presidency by a competent EEAS official 
in the meeting.188  Due to  this development,  it can be concluded that the 
establishment of an efficient ‘deputisation’ system has required the setting up of new 
working procedures between the EEAS and the rotating Presidency in form of a 
sophisticated, yet informal coordination process. 
5.2  European Council and Council of the EU 
With regard to European Council meetings, the impossibility of ‘replacing’ 
Ashton  is  more of a theoretical nature and not practically relevant.189  Normally, 
summits  only take  place more or less quarterly,190  and meetings where  issues of 
external relations  are  debated are  given  the highest priority  by the HR/VP.191 
Furthermore, she will vice versa be highly criticised if she dares to miss them.192 Thus, 
the practical  exigency for the creation of a ‘deputy’ is limited because  of the 
relative unlikelihood of Ashton’s absence.  
As to the FAC, officials confirmed that the HR/VP’s ‘replacement’ works in line 
with the explicit arrangement of the Council’s Rules of Procedure, which calls the 
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Minister of the rotating Presidency  to chair the FAC instead of Ashton.193  The 
‘deputisation’ by an official is impossible, since their seniority does not correspond to 
the ministerial level.194 
Given  that  the chair  is said to have  particular influence  on the decision-
making process, it was admitted that it could indeed be problematic to yield such 
an important ‘post’ to the Presidency,195 if the member state holding the Presidency 
uses  this opportunity to pursue its national  foreign policy interests by pushing its 
preferred agenda.196 Moreover, a too frequent rotation of the Presidency can risk a 
shortcoming in the FAC’s policy continuity.197 However, it was instantly emphasised 
that, generally, there exists a considerable degree of respect towards the HR/VP’s 
position on the part of the rotating  Presidency.198  Furthermore, in the event of 
Ashton’s absence, the FAC meeting is either postponed199 or the EEAS forwards her 
priorities and agenda items to the rotating Presidency in order to make sure that 
policy continuity is secured as far as possible.200 Finally, since FAC meetings usually 
take  place  only once a month201  and are considered a priority,  it is mostly 
manageable for Ashton to ensure her attendance.  
In light of  these pro’s and con’s, although this ‘replacement’ provision 
apparently does not present a threat to the efficient assumption of this particular 
‘task’ in general, the risk of negative consequences remains, which is why a request 
for true ‘deputisation’ appears justified. This would also correspond to the established 
practice among national delegations, which occasionally send “representatives […] 
that can differ in terms of their status” to meetings at ministerial level.202 
5.3  European Commission 
  For two reasons  the HR/VP’s ‘replacement’  in the weekly meetings of the 
College of Commissioners is a much more considerable problem than in the other 
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institutions.  First, Commission and EEAS officials  confirmed  that it is  most often the 
Head of Cabinet or –  if not available  –  another member from her cabinet  who 
attends  the meetings in  case of the HR/VP’s absence.203  In line with the Rules of 
Procedure, however, these officials only state the position of the HR/VP if they are 
requested to do so.204 Moreover, they do not sit around the College table but at the 
back and do not take part in debates.205  Given their quasi inexistent leverage in 
meetings,  these representatives  are hardly able to assume the External Relations 
Commissioner’s functions that the Lisbon Treaty assigned  to the HR/VP or  to 
effectively defend her position.206  
  Second, the HR/VP absence occurs frighteningly often since the Commission’s 
organisational  nature and its working methods are difficult to reconcile  with the 
‘tasks’ under her other two ‘hats’.207 Meetings of the Commission’s College usually 
take  place every Wednesday morning, while meetings of the FAC tend  to be 
scheduled for Mondays and Tuesdays and European Councils for Thursdays and 
Fridays.208  Commission officials interviewed indicated  that during weeks where 
neither a FAC nor a European Council meeting takes place, the HR/VP theoretically 
would have time from Wednesday afternoon until the following Tuesday evening to 
perform her numerous, travel-intense diplomatic ‘tasks’ without having to absent 
herself from the College meetings.209 Yet, this view was rejected by the EEAS officials 
interviewed, by pointing to the practical incompatibility between the demands of 
the different ‘tasks’.210 Moreover, it was highlighted that since priority is already given 
to the attendance of Council, European Council and European Parliament plenary 
meetings, it is  impossible to equally prioritise the College, if she is  expected to 
perform in international representational duties.211 Without entering further into these 
inter-institutional arguments, Ashton’s absence rate for Commission meetings, which 
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in 2010 amounted to 40 percent,212 makes a clear case for the practical difficulty for 
one person to successfully manage the combination of the three ‘hats’ and it 
demonstrates that the need for ‘deputisation’ is nowhere as urgent as within the 
Commission.  
According to an official interviewed, the Commission for the time being does 
not envisage deviating from the principle of mandatory attendance or amending its 
Rules of Procedure.213  Yet, given the problematic situation at least a  practical 
arrangement should be found which allows for the HR/VP’s ‘deputisation’ or at least 
‘replacement’ in a way that an efficient performance of her duties is guaranteed.  
5.4  External representation 
Ideas for a ‘replacement’ system within the Commission could be taken over 
from the arrangements in place for the HR/VP’s ‘replacement’ in ministerial political 
dialogues with third parties. In principle, the HR/VP is required to attend around 80 of 
such meetings a year.214 These, however, are far too many given her various other 
appointments within the EU’s institutional environment, which is why the conceptuali-
sation of this task creates an impossibility in practice.215 
In the beginning of her term, the HR/VP's ‘replacement’ in dialogue meetings 
was run on a case-by-case  basis, which had the disadvantages of being non-
transparent and  of leading to potential inter-institutional  turf  wars  for the right to 
representtation.216  Consequently,  the challenge was to delegate representational 
duties to other EU interlocutors in such a careful manner that diplomatic relations 
with  dialogue partners, who naturally tended to strive for the highest ranked 
interlocutor they could possibly get, were not compromised.217 Therefore, the EEAS in 
the first half of 2011 presented a blueprint aiming to enhance the EU’s predictability 
in its third country representation by proposing four different options for the HR/VP’s 
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‘replacement’.218  Following  the  discussion at Coreper  level,  an  agreement  was 
reached on two options, which are currently applied in practice.219  
The first option consists in the chairing of meetings by the rotating Presidency 
together with a Commissioner, which applies to most Stabilisation and Association as 
well as Cooperation Council meetings.220 In case the Presidency is unable to replace 
the HR/VP, option two foresees that a ministerial representative from another 
member state  is asked to take over this task.221  This systematic downgrading of 
certain ministerial political dialogue meetings does not mean that the HR/VP would 
attach a minor importance to these meetings.222  Such a downgrading responds 
rather to the need to adapt the logic of the EU’s external representation to the 
Lisbon  Treaty  era: While in the pre-Lisbon  system, the  rotating Presidency had an 
interest to chair as many meetings as possible during its six-monthly term in office, the 
HR/VP during her five-year term in principle does have sufficient time to meet with all 
of the other countries’ interlocutors.223 In light of her numerous other commitments, 
however, the HR/VP only prioritises a Stabilisation and Association or Cooperation 
Council meeting, in order to discuss important and current issues that demand her 
personal involvement, while it would not be rational to attend meetings for the only 
sake of maintaining the pre-Lisbon practice of regular, six-monthly meetings without 
any substantial reason.224  
In this context, it is also worth highlighting that this blueprint was not granted 
the status of a formal or even legal document in order for the  options to be 
effectively applied and not to become subject to criticism from dialogue partners.225 
In order to identify well in advance those meetings in which the chair should be 
assumed by the Presidency, the EEAS has established and progressively refined226 a 
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coordination procedure  between the Policy Coordination, the individual EEAS 
services, Executive Secretary-General Vimont, the HR/VP herself and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the respective rotating Presidency.227 
Thus, it can be concluded that even if, for the time being, ‘deputisation’ is not 
an option for the ‘replacement’ of the HR/VP in political dialogue meetings, other 
forms of ‘replacement’ are applied in practice, which are characterised by a high 
degree of informality and a progressive enhancement of the coordination 
procedure by the EEAS.  
6. Conclusion 
The first aim of this paper was to assess to what extent the Lisbon Treaty legally 
allows for 'deputisation'. By applying established interpretation methods to the TEU, it 
has been shown that the  historical interpretation is  inadequate  to overcome  the 
legal constraints of the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, it is able to reveal that the institutionalisa-
tion of different forms of ‘deputies’ was considered during the Convention. More-
over,  the  systematic interpretation provides  indeed  some good arguments for 
imputing to the ‘position’ of the HR/VP an institutional capacity, which allows her to 
provide for its ‘deputisation’. However, frictions arising from the fact that the HR/VP is 
not an institution in itself impede a wholly satisfying solution to the problem. Finally, by 
arguing that only by the setup of a ‘deputisation’ structure the HR/VP can assure the 
fulfilment of the objectives set out in the Treaty,  the  teleological interpretation  – 
albeit not without obstacles – offers the best solution. Thus, it can be concluded that 
the establishment of ‘deputies’ is legally possible without amending the Lisbon Treaty.  
The second question asked whether – in absence of an explicit legal basis – 
other EU institutions permit the HR/VP to ‘deputise’ or to be ‘replaced’. A scrutiny of 
the  Rules of Procedure and  political agreements has  shown  that the European 
Parliament is the only actor in the Union’s institutional environment that allows for 
‘deputisation’ and  only  to a very limited extent  on the level of parliamentary 
committee meetings.  While  this institution  and the Council rather favour forms  of 
‘replacement’, the European Council and the Commission de facto also preclude 
this possibility.  
Finally, a third objective was to examine  how the HR/VP's ‘replacement’  is 
working in practice and whether it can be considered as efficient. It has been 
affirmed  that in the EU’s  internal environment, practice generally functions 
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according to the rules presented in section  4.  Contrary to this rule, an informal 
practice of ‘deputisation’ is applied  before the European  Parliament, where  the 
EEAS Executive  Secretary-General  or  a competent EEAS official  is  supposed to 
perform the ‘deputy’ function  even  in plenary sessions.  On the other hand, 
'deputisation' had been discussed for the conduct of ministerial political dialogue 
meetings but was rejected by EU member  states. In these meetings, it is up to a 
Commissioner and the rotating Presidency to 'replace' the HR/VP, which also means 
that the rotating Presidency continues playing a role in the EU’s external 
representation in the Lisbon era. As to the efficiency of ‘replacement’ arrangements, 
it has been revealed that the extent to which these practices are able to mitigate 
the difficulties, which arise from the lack of a possibility of ‘deputisation’, differs from 
one case to another. Provided that in the case of meetings of the FAC and  the 
European Council the HR/VP manages to ensure her presence by giving priority to 
these meetings, the ‘replacement’ provision in the FAC would be sufficient and the 
impossibility to be ‘replaced’ in the European Council tolerable. Consequently, the 
need for ‘deputies’ would be limited with regard to these institutions. Moreover, the 
elaborated arrangements for the HR/VP’s ‘replacement’ before European 
Parliament and in ministerial political dialogue meetings promise to be good long-
term solutions that can  ensure the assumption of her  respective  ‘tasks’.  However, 
provisions made for ‘deputisation’ or ‘replacement’ have proved to be particularly 
urgent in the case of the Commission, where it has been evidenced that the cabinet 
member sent to meetings of the College is unable to assume the HR/VP’s ‘tasks’ due 
to his limited procedural rights.  Therefore, the establishment of a practical 
arrangement for ‘deputisation’ or at least ‘replacement’ in the Commission College 
is certainly the most recommended reform measure at present. As to the future of 
the ‘deputisation’ concept in the  whole EU institutional environment, it should be 
further promoted and progressively extended to other areas  since it can offer a 
pragmatic solution to the challenge of making the HR/VP’s job work in an efficient 
way. The case of ‘deputisation’ before the European Parliament demonstrates that 
such a solution is most likely to be successful if it is based on an informal agreement 
and a sophisticated coordination procedure. 
 Martin Schmid 
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